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CONDOMINIUM LENDING TRAP
MELVYN MITZNER*
INTRODUCTION
A recent amendment to Article 9-B of the New York Real
Property Law' allows a condominium's board of managers to bor-
row money for capital purposes,2 subject to the approval of a
majority in common interest of the unit owners.3 Since the New
York legislature was concerned that sponsors rather than subse-
quent boards of managers would be able to use this statute as a
financing tool, a provision was inserted that prohibited financing
earlier than the fifth anniversary of the first conveyance of a
unit.' The sum and substance of the statute is that the board of
managers may assign rights in future income and common
charges to the lender and create a security interest in those pro-
ceeds.' If there are other assets, such as real estate, the real es-
* Senior Vice President and Chief Underwriting Counsel - New York at Com-
monwealth Land Title Insurance Company in New York, Lawyers Title Insurance
Corporation.
'Condominium Act of Aug. 26, 1997, ch. 498, 1997 N.Y. Laws 1457 (codified at
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-j (McKinney Supp. 1998)).
2 See id. § 339-jj(1) (McKinney Supp. 1998) ("To the extent authorized by the
declaration of the by-laws, the board of managers, on behalf of the unit owners, may
incur debt ... for any of the purposes enumerated in paragraph (b) of subdivision
two of section three hundred thirty-nine-v of this article. . . ."); see also id. § 339-
v(2)(b) (stating that the by-laws may include "[pirovisions govern-
ing... collection... of funds ... for major and minor maintenance, repairs, addi-
tions, improvements, replacements, working capital, bad debts and unpaid common
expenses, depreciation, obsolescence and similar purposes").
3 See id. § 339-jj(1)(b) (providing that "incurrence of such debt shall require the
consent of a majority in common interest of the unit owners").
4 See id. § 339-jj(1)(a) (stating that "such debt is incurred no earlier than the
fifth anniversary of the first conveyance of a unit"); Senate's Memorandum in Sup-
port of ch. 498, N.Y. Laws (Aug. 26, 1997), reprinted in 1997 N.Y. Laws 2471, 2472
(stating that section 339-ji was constructed to permit funding for needed capital re-
pairs, especially to older buildings, but protecting unit owners from "improvident
borrowing").
5 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-jj(2) (providing that "the board of managers,
on behalf of the unit owners, may (a) assign the rights in and to receive future in-
come and common charges, (b) create a security interest in, assign, pledge, mort-
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tate may be mortgaged.' The board of managers is charged with
a trustee's obligation as to the trust funds coming into its hands
to pay such debt before paying any other obligation, except that
of mechanics lienors, whose rights were apparently not disturbed
by the amendment. The lender also has the power to increase
the common charges to pay the debt, including the power to file a
common charge lien against each non-paying unit owner, and
has the right to foreclose those liens.' The amendment to the
statute, to which this author contributed,' does not authorize the
board of managers to lien the common elements."
The Condominium Act11 has always contained a provision
allowing condominiums to create liens on the common ele-
ments." This section of the statute is expressed in the negative
and states as follows: "Subsequent to recording the declaration
and while the property remains subject to this article, no lien of
any nature shall thereafter arise or be created against the com-
mon elements, except with the unanimous consent of the unit
owners." 3 The statute also provides that "[d]uring such period,
liens may arise or be created only against the several units and
their respective common interests."'4
The following is a discussion of the problems that may arise
from section 339-/ of the New York Real Property Law and sec-
tion 339-jj, the recent amendment. There are statutory pitfalls
that may trap lenders, purchasers, or mortgagees of a condomin-
ium unit. Fortunately, as suggested by this Article, there are
gage or otherwise encumber funds or other real or personal property that it holds")
6 See id. § 339-jj(2)(b).
7 See id. § 339-jj(2)(c).
8 See id. § 339-jj(2)(d).
9 The members of the committee in no particular order were Matthew J. Leeds,
Esq., Joel E. Miller, Esq., Perry Balagur, Esq., Stuart M. Saft, Esq., Richard A.
Nardi, Esq., Richard Siegler, Esq., Daniel L. Krimmer, Esq., Alan Reis, Esq. and
Melvyn Mitzner, Esq.
See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-jj(2)(d). The statute provides:
[The] board of managers... may... agree that at the lender's direction it
will increase common charges to the extent necessary to pay any amount
when due under any of the provisions of the agreements under which the
debt was incurred. The preceding sentence shall not be construed to
authorize the board of managers to create a lien on the common elements.
Id. 11 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 339-d to -ij (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1998).
12 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-1(1) (McKinney 1989).
1" Id.
14 Id.
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ways to avoid these dangers.
I. THE COMMON ELEMENTS MAY BE USED FOR FINANCING
One potential problem created by the statute is a situation
in which the purchaser is not made aware that the common ele-
ments may be used for financing. For example, a sponsor may
use an offering plan to obtain authorization for a mortgage. In
the offering plan example that follows, a sponsor has created an
ongoing source of income by mortgaging the recreation areas. In
this case, the sponsor can claim that the mortgage has been
authorized by "all of the unit owners" because consent was given
in the original offering plan and unit deed.
The language, redacted to eliminate identifying elements,
set forth in the introduction portion of the offering plan states as
follows:
The Condominium shall give to the Sponsor a first Mortgage on
the property comprising the pool facilities in the sum of
_ Said Mortgage shall bear interest at the
rate of - per annum, shall be self-liquidating and shall be
paid in equal monthly installments of principal and interest.
Completion of the recreational facilities is anticipated by
at which time said Mortgage shall be executed and
recorded. The debt service will commence immediately follow-
ing the date of the execution of such Mortgage. The Mortgage
will be for a period of thirty (30) years with payments based
upon a thirty (30) year payout commencing on the date of such
Mortgage. Each monthly payment shall be in the amount of
_ . The Mortgage shall be on the standard
NYBTU form, with additional riders thereto as contained in
Part II of the offering. The Sponsor will pay any mortgage tax
and any other charges incurred in recording the Mortgage. The
debt service for such Mortgage is to be paid by the Unit Owners
as a Condominium Expense. The interest on such Mortgage is
not tax deductible by Unit Owners.
The deed to each Unit Owner contains the following:
SUBJECT TO those additional items set forth on "Schedule A"
annexed hereto and made a part hereof.
Schedule A contains the following provision:
Mortgage made by _ to in the
original principal amount of dated
, and recorded in the Clerk's office on
1999]
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in Liber (Reel) - Page __ (affects
common areas only). If the foregoing Mortgage has not been
made or recorded prior to the conveyance of title to the Unit,
Grantee, nevertheless, shall take title subject to such Mortgage
if, as and when made and/or recorded.
There is no provision in the special risk portion of the offer-
ing plan that advises the purchaser of the proposed financing of
the recreation portion of the common elements. Thus, the pur-
chaser may provide consent to the financing unknowingly.
II. CONSENTS REQUIRED TO MAKE A VALID MORTGAGE
Another problem with section 339-1 is its vagueness. It is
unclear what type of consent is necessary and from whom the
consent must be obtained in order to make a valid mortgage.
The statute states that the mortgage must be made with the
"unanimous consent of the unit owners."15 When a sponsor
makes a mortgage to the sponsor affiliate, he is still the owner of
all of the units. The question is, therefore, whether a valid con-
dominium is created when all the units are still owned by the
sponsor, or whether at least one unit must be sold before a valid
condominium can exist. Another question is whether a sale of
the first unit is complete when the first unit is contracted for and
the sponsor no longer has the ability to terminate any contract of
sale, due to the fact that all conditions on both the lender and
borrower have been satisfied under the offering plan or the loan
documents.
One can also argue that the mortgaging of recreation facili-
ties has the effect of creating a valid condominium-that the
mortgage made prior to the conveyance of the first unit is the act
that creates the condominium. An examination of the mortgag-
ing documents is necessary to determine whether this would be
effective against a blanket mortgagee who did not consent to the
mortgage of the recreational portion of the common elements.
Usually, a blanket mortgage contains provisions that the mort-
gagee will have to subordinate to a declaration of condominium
when certain criteria have been reached, such as the sale of two-
thirds of the units pursuant to contracts. The mortgaging of the
common elements usually constitutes a default under the blan-
ket mortgage and triggers an acceleration of the debt under the
16 Id.
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blanket note and blanket mortgage. A sponsor does risk such a
default in a successfully sold condominium. Therefore, the con-
sent must be given while the sponsor still owns all the units.
The mortgage is later recorded or financed only after the original
blanket mortgage has been released against all of the units; re-
cording the mortgage too early causes a blanket mortgage accel-
eration and a foreclosure against the remaining units and their
common elements. Thus, sponsor strategy is a key factor.
In a case where the blanket mortgage does foreclose late in
the sale and closing schedule, the blanket mortgagee would at
best have title to the untransfered units subject to the mortgage
on the common elements. The blanket mortgagee surrenders its
lien on the common elements with a subordination of the blanket
mortgage to the declaration of condominium. The sponsor can
defeat the easy subsequent transfer of the units due to the mort-
gage on the recreation portion of the common elements. In fact,
even though the lender, its nominee, or purchasers of the con-
dominium units control the units through the board of managers,
the lender is obligated to pay the sponsor mortgagee on the
mortgage note or risk losing the common elements on a foreclo-
sure, and it is also obligated to pay off the sponsor mortgage if
such a right exists under the sponsor's note or mortgage.
If the sponsor commences foreclosure there is a right under
statute to pay off the mortgage prior to judicial sale. 6 In such a
case, the foreclosing mortgagee incurs additional expense in
making its loan. It is clear that in order for a blanket mortgagee
to prevent this type of dilemma, strict approval on the content of
the offering plan, declaration and by-laws is necessary.'7 A blan-
16 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1341 (McKinney 1979). This section states:
Where an action is brought to foreclose a mortgage upon real property
upon which any part of the principal or interest is due, and another portion
of either is to become due, and the defendant pays into court the amount
due for principal and interest and the costs of the action, together with the
expenses of the proceedings to sell, if any, the court shall:
1. Dismiss the complaint without costs against plaintiff, if the payment is
made before judgment directing sale; or
2. Stay all proceedings upon judgment, if the payment is made after
judgment directing sale and before sale; but, upon a subsequent default in
the payment of principal or interest, the court may make an order direct-
ing the enforcement of the judgment for the purpose of collecting the sum
then due.
Id.
17 By forgoing strict approval of the offering plan, declaration, and by-laws, a
blanket mortgagee would allow a sponsor to lien the common elements. The blanket
1999]
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ket mortgagee should require language that no changes are
permitted to an offering plan, declaration of condominium or by-
laws without its consent.
III. THE COMMON ELEMENTS: REAL PROPERTY OR PERSONALTY?
Another gray area created by the statute exists with respect
to the definition of common elements. It is unclear whether
common elements may be viewed as real or personal property for
financing purposes. That is, whether a mortgage liening all or a
portion of the common elements is a lien on real or personal
property. It is clear that the common elements fall under the
statute's definition of property." However, it is unclear whether
they are real, personal, or mixed. In contrast to its vague treat-
ment of the common elements, the statute clearly defines a unit
as real property. 9 However, another section dealing with the
definition of common elements states that the land can be a
common element.0 Under the offering plan used as an illustra-
tion above, both the land and the recreation area qualify as
common elements. Here again the condominium documents
must be examined to determine it any of the common elements
were intended to be real estate.
IV. INTEREST RATES
Can a sponsor mortgage the recreation package with an in-
terest rate exceeding the rate permitted by the civil usury stat-
utes? A leading case2' held that a purchase money mortgage is
neither a loan nor a forbearance' and is therefore not subject to
mortgagee would then risk losing his priority to the common elements in the lending
hierarchy.1 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-e(11) (McKinney 1989). It states as follows:
"Property" means and includes the land, the building and all other im-
provements thereon, (i) owned in fee simple absolute.... and all ease-
ments, rights and appurtenances belonging thereto, and all other property,
personal or mixed, intended for use in connection therewith, which have
been or are intended to be submitted to the provisions of this article.
Id. 19 Id. § 339-g ("Each unit, together with its common interest, shall for all pur-
poses constitute real property.").
20 Id. § 339-e(3) (" 'Common elements', unless otherwise provided in the decla-
ration, means and includes: (a) The land on which the building is located.. .
21 Mandelino v. Fribourg, 242 N.E.2d 823 (N.Y. 1968).
22 See id. at 824.
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the usury statute.' In another case, the sponsors formed a cor-
poration to administer a cooperative housing conversion plan
that would finance tenants' purchases of their apartments.' The
court held that such financing was not a loan subject to the pro-
hibition and forfeiture provisions of usury statutes.' The court
stated that "[slince it is an intention to sell property rather than
to lend money that governs the characterization of any given
transaction,' 6 a sponsor financing above the legal civil rate will
not be usurious. The sum and substance of the determination is,
therefore, whether the transaction is an extension of credit for a
purchase or a loan. An extension of credit differs from a loan in
that its focus is the sale, not the transfer, of funds. In the sam-
ple offering plan used as an example in this Article, it is clear
that the sponsor is selling units-and the definition of "units"
includes a percentage of the common elements-but not the
common elements themselves. Whether this mortgage is exempt
from the usury statutes is unclear because the sponsor is not
selling the common elements directly but, rather, incidentally to
the sale of the units. Only the courts can determine what rights
will arise under such circumstances.
V. RIGHTS OF A COURT-APPOINTED RECEIVER
Another area of confusion involves the rights of a court-
appointed receiver in the foreclosure of a mortgage on the com-
mon elements. Assuming the mortgage provides for the ap-
See id. at 826 (citing McAnsh v. Blauner, 226 N.Y.S. 379, 381 (App. Div.
1928)). However, "[an instrument which appears on its face to be a purchase-money
mortgage may in truth be a cloak for an actual loan at excessive interest and in this
situation it may be deemed usurious." Id.
24 See DeSimon v. Ogden Assocs., 454 N.Y.S.2d 721 (App. Div. 1982). Under the
plan the sponsor was to establish a fund of $85,000, from which tenants who had
twice been refused bank financing could draw funds to purchase their apartments.
See id. at 722-23. The agreement prescribed an interest rate and origination fee
equal to that charged by Citibank on its cooperative housing loans, determined on
the date of closing. See id. at 723. The tenants in DeSimon sought a declaration that
the loans were usurious, alleging "that the interest rate and origination fee were
each a point higher than Citibank[sl." Id. The resulting interest rate was 15%. See
id. Further, the tenants attempted to argue that the financing was not a purchase
money loan "because the seller of plaintiffs' shares was the corporation, not the
sponsor." Id. The court rejected this argument, saying it "ignore[d] the reality of the
parties' transaction by deleting from the flow of consideration.., the sponsor's con-
sideration-its real property-conveyed to the corporation." Id. at 728.
2Id. at 728 ("Sponsor financing simply does not constitute money lending.").26 Id. at 726.
1999]
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pointment of a receiver, and a court appoints one, what would
such a receiver do? Can the receiver stand in place of the board
of managers and collect the common charge for the sponsor-
mortgagee or for any other mortgagee of the common elements?
If the declaration of condominium or by-laws do not expressly
allow for the receiver to take the common charges and pay the
sponsor mortgage first, it appears that no court has the author-
ity to appoint a receiver. In fact, one statute makes it clear
that mechanics lienors who perform work for the common ele-
ments are entitled to the first monies coming into the possession
of the board of managers.8 A similar provision apparently has
been drafted into the condominium finance bill 29 which would
allow the board of managers to assign and create a security in-
terest, subject to section 339-1(2), on the common charges for
borrowing by the board of managers. The statute makes it clear
that:
[A]ll common charges received and to be received by [the board
of managers] and the right to receive such funds, shall consti-
27 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-aa (McKinney Supp. 1998). It states that in
foreclosure of a lien for common charges:
[Tihe unit owner shall be required to pay a reasonable rental for the unit
for any period prior to sale pursuant to judgment of foreclosure and sale, if
so provided in the by-laws, and the plaintiff in such foreclosure shall be en-
titled to the appointment of a receiver to collect the same.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Societe Generale v. Charles & Co. Acquisition, Inc.,
597 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (refusing to appoint a receiver on the
grounds that "the language of the statute and by-laws only authorize appointment
of a receiver to collect rent from the 'unit owner' " and here "there [were] neither
rents nor profits to be collected as the unit [was] vacant") (emphasis added).
28 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-1(2) (McKinney 1989). The statute mandates:
Labor performed on or materials furnished to a unit shall not be the basis
for the filing of a lien pursuant to article two of the lien law against the
unit of any unit owner not expressly consenting to or requesting the same,
except in the case of emergency repairs. No labor performed on or materi-
als furnished to the common elements shall be the basis for a lien thereon,
but all common charges received and to be received by the board of manag-
ers, and the right to receive such funds, shall constitute trust funds for the
purpose of paying the cost of such labor or materials performed or fur-
nished at the express request or with the consent of the manager, manag-
ing agent or board of managers, and the same shall be expended first for
such purpose before expending any part of the same for any other purpose.Id. d See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-ji (McKinney Supp. 1998) ("In connection
with a debt incurred by it, the board of managers, may (a) assign the rights in...
common charges, (b) create a security interest .... subject to the provisions of sub-
division two of section three hundred thirty-nine- of this article.").
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tute trust funds for the purpose of paying such debt and the
same shall be expended for such purpose before expending any
part of the same for any other purpose.0
It is clear that a receiver appointed pursuant to a sponsor
mortgage or a mortgage of the common elements stands subordi-
nate to a receiver or lender exercising its rights under the financ-
ing bill. However, if the declaration or by-laws contain provi-
sions allowing a receiver to be appointed for a sponsor
mortgaging the common elements, it is unclear who will have
priority in a later common charge financing pursuant to the con-
dominium finance bill. It seems the net effect will be to discour-
age financing by lenders on the common charges where such
provisions are contained in thb declarations.
VI. OWNER CONSENT AND SPONSOR MORTGAGES
The issue of owner consent is not a clear one. One case that
discussed the statute's consent requirement stated in dictum
that the unanimous consent of unit owners is not "evident nor
may it be implied."3' While this case, and other reported cases,
deal with mechanics liens, the courts have yet to rule on the is-
sue of owner consent regarding sponsor mortgages. However in
light of the aforementioned rulings, it seems likely that the
courts will also require full consent of the purchasing unit own-
ers to validate sponsor mortgages.
As an illustration, consider a mortgage that is recorded
against the recreation area, described by metes and bounds.
There is a mortgagor default-the board of managers refuses or
is unable to pay the sponsor-affiliate-and the mortgagee is the
sole bidder at the foreclosure sale. When the mortgagee pur-
chases the recreation package, it ceases to be part of the common
elements." Since it is no longer a part of the common elements,
"Id § 339-jj(2)(c).
" Diamond Architecturals, Inc. v. EFCO Corp., 578 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554 (App. Div.
1992) (discussing a lien filed by a subcontractor who imposed a blanket lien on an
entire building). The court stated that "Section 339-1(1) prohibits creation of a lien
against the common elements of the condominium subsequent to the recording of
the condominium declaration without the unanimous consent of the unit owners."
I&L
22 Cf. In re M.M.E. Power Enters., Inc., 613 N.Y.S.2d 266, 267 (App. Div. 1994)
(affirming lower court's cancellation of the liens on the grounds that the property
description contained therein was inadequate, but stating that the liens would have
been invalid even with an adequate description because they were executed without
the unanimous consent of the homeowners' association members); see also In re At-
1999]
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the recreation package could theoretically be separately added to
the tax rolls.33 However, in most municipalities this would vio-
late subdivision laws.34 It would also require consent from vari-
ous municipal zoning boards and taxing authorities.35 A local
municipal corporation counsel, or town or village board, could
commence an action to set aside a conveyance from a referee in a
foreclosure of a mortgage on the common elements to the pur-
chaser of a portion of the common elements at a foreclosure
sale. 6
Finally, anyone who purchases at a foreclosure sale pur-
chases subject to the provisions of the declaration of condomin-
ium, which usually affords rights and privileges to the unit own-
ers in the use of the recreation area.37 However, the declaration
need not mention the payment of fees.8 If it does not, common
charges might not be appropriated or collected for the payment
of the recreation charge, since the property is no longer a com-
las Tile & Marble Works, Inc., 595 N.Y.S.2d 10, 10-11 (App. Div. 1993) (afffiming
lower court's vacatur of lien for inadequate property description and failure to ob-
tain unanimous consent of unit owners); Westage Towers Assocs. v. ABM Air Con-
ditioning & Refrigeration, Inc., 590 N.Y.S.2d 118, 118 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that
"a 'blanket lien'. . . is not valid as against the individual units").
"3 That is, because the mortgagee now owns the recreation package in full, the
unit owners are no longer tenants in common of the recreation package.
34 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-i(3) (McKinney 1989) ("The common elements
shall remain undivided and no right shall exist to partition or divide any
thereof .. ").
3- N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 34(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1998) ("No plat of a subdivi-
sion of land showing lots, blocks or sites shall be filed or recorded in the office of the
county clerk or register until it has been approved by a planning board which has
been empowered to approve such plats."); see also N.Y. TOWN LAW § 268(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1998) (empowering "the proper local authorities of the town [to]
institute any appropriate action or proceedings to prevent" an unlawful subdivision);
N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-714 (McKinney 1996) (similarly empowering "the proper local
authorities of the village" to institute proceedings to prevent unlawfil erection or
construction).
36 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-n(5) (McKinney 1989) ("The declaration shall
contain... [a] description of the common elements and a statement of the common
interest of each unit owner.").
37 See id. § 339-n (setting forth the required elements of a declaration of con-
dominium).
38 Section 339-n sets forth all of the required elements of a declaration of con-
dominium. Id. However, there is no express mention of the payment of fees. See id.
Moreover, section 339-n(8) states that "any further details in connection with the
property which the person or persons executing the declaration may deem desirable
to set forth" may be included. Id. § 339-n(8). Thus, it appears that although the
payment of fees may be mentioned in a declaration of condominium, it is not manda-
tory.
[73:171
CONDOMINIUM LENDING TRAP
mon element. A lender or purchaser of a recreation area at a
foreclosure sale must be very careful in order to establish a
money stream from the recreation package. The declaration may
also address the use of recreation areas by persons other than
the unit owners. The lender or purchaser must also be mindful
of such provisions. The Attorney General's office can only re-
quire notice of risk for the protection of purchasers and their
lenders.
VII. EFFECT ON THE INDIVIDUAL UNITS
What about the lenders on the various units? The recreation
area mortgage or other common element mortgage is not a lien
on the unit or its common interest. Therefore, if a unit lender
forecloses its mortgage, it does not foreclose on the recreation
area or common element mortgage. The effect on such a unit
lender would only be in the evaluation of the value of the unit
being mortgaged. Certainly a unit without an interest in a rec-
reation area would be worth substantially less than the same
unit with such an interest. The possibility of loss of a recreation
area may have an adverse effect on how a lender considers the
value of a unit for making mortgages. Where there is no sub-
stantial equity down payment paid by a unit purchaser and the
unit lender is loaning a substantial portion of the unit value or
purchase price, the value for mortgaging purposes may be low-
ered by the fear of loss of the recreation area.
A lender on a recreation area or other portion of the common
elements must also be concerned with the following: Will the
consent of a sponsor who owns all of the units bind subsequent
unit owners to the mortgage? In other words, does the consent of
a sponsor who owns all the units constitute the unanimous con-
sent as required by the statute? In foreclosing the mortgage, do
the condominium documents afford a money stream even though
the property is no longer a common element of the condominium?
Does the board of managers of the condominium or unit owners
of the condominium have to pay for the use of the recreation area
or other common elements? Is it obligatory or permissive? If a
foreclosure takes place, can the recreation package stand by it-
self? Does the recreation area have access to a public street, or
are there easements for utilities, either through the condomin-
ium grounds or to a public street?
1999]
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The provisions of the statute that allow for a separate mort-
gage on either all or part of the condominium common elements
create myriad problems and conflicts. The mortgagee of a por-
tion of the common elements, a purchaser of either a condomin-
ium unit or a portion of the common elements at a foreclosure
sale, or a blanket mortgagee loaning money to purchase or build
a condominium must be mindful of the rights reserved in the
condominium documents as to the mortgaging of all or a portion
of the common elements.
One solution would be to eliminate the mortgaging provi-
sions of the section 339-1 regarding the unit owners' consent.
Other than the practice mentioned herein, the section is now
unnecessary since the passage of section 339-jj, the condominium
financing law.
